During the crossing of the Alps, Hannibal’s men, horses and elephants suffered terribly from the cold and ice; many fell to their deaths. In October or November, after fifteen days in the mountains, he descended into Italy. Casualties and desertions had halved his army, i.e. to twenty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry out of its original fifty thousand.
He came out of the mountains in the land of the Taurini, the region around modern Turin. For his long-term success he needed to increase his numbers by persuading the Gauls in Italy to join him before he met the Romans. When the Taurini rejected his offer of friendship, he captured their chief town and the neighbouring tribes soon agreed to help him.
When told of Hannibal’s arrival the Senate recalled Sempronius (4) from Sicily, where after the failed attempts by the Carthaginian fleets on the islands he had captured Malta and passed the summer in securing the Sicilian and Italian coasts. Hannibal’s mere presence in Northern Italy had brought about the withdrawal of the direct threat to Carthage itself.
In late November, Publius Scipio (16) crossed the Po River over a makeshift bridge of boats. He continued northwards and bridged a second river, the Ticinus (a tributary joining the Po from the northwest), and encamped on its northeast bank where Hannibal was approaching from the northwest.
A preliminary skirmish between cavalry scouting parties developed into a full battle. Publius placed his velites (javelineers) in front of his Gallic cavalry, keeping his Italian horse in reserve; Hannibal placed his heavy Iberian cavalry in the centre and his Numidian light infantry on the wings. Before the velites could throw their missiles, both sides’ heavy cavalry met in the centre and the velites were forced to retreat through the line of the Gallic horsemen. For a while neither side held the advantage until the Numidian cavalry swept round the Roman flanks, cutting down the velites before wheeling and striking the Roman horse to the rear. Publius found himself wounded and isolated; tradition says that he was rescued by his son 16Cornelius Scipio (53; fl.218-183 BC). Publius retreated back over both rivers, destroyed the Po bridge behind him, marched eastwards to Placentia and encamped on the west bank of the Trebia River, a tributary west of the city joining the Po from the south.
Meanwhile, Hannibal had reached the Po, searched upstream until he found an easier place to cross, built a bridge of boats and taken his army over. At Clastidium, where the Romans kept their grain supply, he bribed the garrison commander, Dasius of Brundisium, to surrender the city. He then spent a few days meeting with the Gallic chieftains in the region. Many of them supplied him with provisions and joined the Carthaginian forces. He then marched to Placentia, where he formed up on the flat plain to the west of Publius’ forces.
That night, Gauls in the service of Rome murdered a number of sleeping legionaries and then deserted to Hannibal. Realising that his position was becoming untenable, Publius took his troops to cross the Trebia into a more defensible position. He was still suffering from his wounds when Sempronius, who had marched from Messana to Ariminum, arrived around early December and assumed command of the army.
Hannibal’s army had grown to 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry; the Romans had 36,000 infantry but only 4000 cavalry. Despite his numerical inferiority Hannibal was eager for a major battle for the same reasons that that Romans would have wanted to avoid one, i.e. the Roman army being raised at it was at this time on an annual basis was relatively inexperienced, while Hannibal’s army was experienced and the Gauls would probably fade away if he not continue to attack the Romans. However, very few Roman commanders of the period would have refused battle against a smaller army.
On an initial inspection, the plain west of the Trebia was an ideal Roman battleground, free of major obstacles. However, Hannibal found a gully, south of what was to be the battlefield, where he placed 2000 men commanded by his brother 06Mago. The next morning Hannibal sent his Numidian cavalry across the river, with orders to provoke the Romans into battle with a series of attacks on their outposts.
Sempronius ordered out his cavalry and skirmishers to meet the Numidians, before ordering his main army to prepare to cross the river and offer battle. This probably took several hours, before the Roman army, tired and wet, formed up for battle against Hannibal’s smaller but rested force.
Sempronius’ four legions took position in the centre with allied infantry on either wing; skirmishers covered the front of the army, the flanks were covered by cavalry. Hannibal positioned his Iberian and Celtic infantry in the centre behind his skirmishers; the cavalry on the flanks were reinforced by the few elephants that had survived the passage of the Alps; his African infantry stood behind the cavalry on either side.
After the skirmishers withdrew, the heavy infantry engaged. The numerically superior Carthaginian cavalry drove the Roman horse from the field and together with the African infantry outflanked the Roman infantry. Mago’s force appeared and attacked the Roman line from the rear. The Roman army was surrounded and destroyed, save for ten thousand infantrymen who cut their way through the Carthaginian centre and retreated to Placentia. Hannibal lost only seven thousand troops.
The Roman troops that survived the battle (probably about eighteen thousand men) wintered in the Po Valley, with Sempronius at Placentia and Publius at Cremona. Hannibal went into winter quarters in Bologna, the capital of his Boii allies.
By spring 217 BC the four legions in the Po Valley had been brought up to full strength and Publius left to join his brother in Spain. Temporary command of his legions was given to 04Atilius Regulus (fl.227-216 BC), who was ordered to move his troops to Ariminum where he passed his command to the consul Gaius 06Servilius Geminus. The other consul 01Flaminius Nepos travelled to Placentia, assumed command of Sempronius’ legions and took his army through Etruria to Arretium. At Ariminum, Servilius blocked Hannibal’s easiest route south; and at Arretium, Flaminius covered one of the major routes through the Apennines (via the Collina Pass) from Bologna, blocking Hannibal’s direct route to Rome. Here the Roman armies waited for Hannibal to move.
In late spring Hannibal crossed the Apennines with an army of fifty-five thousand men into Etruria. What route he took is not precisely known, though he probably crossed the Apennines westwards through the Collina Pass before driving his forces through the dangerous Arno swamps. Most of the pack horses died and many of them became lame due to the prolonged march through the mud. During this crossing Hannibal developed ophthalmia, leading to the loss of sight in one eye.
Leading his army out of a swamp and riding his lone surviving elephant, Hannibal passed the thirty thousand Roman soldiers camped in front of Arretium and pushed on south towards Rome, burning Roman settlements as he went. Flaminius quickly broke his camp and pursued the Punic army.
Hannibal’s route took him eastward through a narrow valley bordered by Lake Trasimene to the south and hills to the north. On entering the valley he positioned his cavalry and Celtic troops in the hills to the north; his Iberian troops and light infantry in the east on a hill at the end of the valley; and the Celts near the western end of the passage.
As soon as the greater part of Flaminius’ army was in the valley, the Celts attacked the rear end of the column, blocking the retreat. When Hannibal’s army descended from the hills, the Romans were taken completely by surprise. What followed was more a slaughter than a battle. Thousands were killed on the shore or driven into the lake. Only the Roman vanguard of 6000 men succeeded in fighting their way through the Carthaginian line. The army was crushed, with 15,000 taken prisoner and 15,000 killed, among them the consul himself. Hannibal lost only 1500 men.
Servilius wanted to bring his entire army to assist Flaminius, but his heavy infantry made this impracticable, so he sent the propraetor Gaius Centenius (1) ahead with four thousand cavalry. Hannibal heard of these enemy reinforcements and sent his cavalry commander Maharbal out to meet them. In the very first clash Centenius lost almost half his men and the rest were pursued and taken prisoner the following day.
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