Ostracism was a method of banishing a politician who had become unpopular. Attributed to Cleisthenes, though there is some doubt because of the delay until its first use in 487 BC, an ostracism could be held once a year if the Assembly voted for it. Each citizen who wished to vote wrote on a fragment of pottery (potsherd; ostrakon) the name of the citizen he wished to send into exile. Provided there was a total of at least 6000 votes then the man whose name appeared on the largest number was banished. He had to leave the country within ten days and stay away for ten years. The first person to be ostracized was Hipparchus, son of Charmus, a relative of Pisistratus.
In 487 BC the method of appointing the nine archons was changed. Hitherto they had been elected by the people, now they were selected from five hundred candidates drawing lots; each candidate being elected by their fellow demesmen, each deme returning a number of candidates according to its size. In the past the archon had the support of a large section of the people, but now he had only the votes of a single deme.
The randomness of the selection process meant that the great clans could no longer monopolise the great offices. As it had always been customary to be archon only once, the war archon now became more dependent on the tribal generals, who could be re-elected and become more experienced. Men who wished to gain political influence now put themselves forward for generalship. With less distinguished ex-archons gradually filling the Aeropagus, its prestige slowly declined.
Themistocles (c.524-459 BC) never doubted that the Persians would come again and that even if they came round the Aegean by land, sea transport would still be the most practical way of supplying a large army. However, his plans to expand the navy were frustrated by the Battle of Marathon, since the victory was won on land by the hoplite infantry. In the midst of the debate the Athenians found themselves at war (487-481 BC) with Aegina over the hostages.
The land forces, the men of substance who paid for their own armour and were not paid, were represented by Aristides the Just (c.525-468 BC), a strategos at Marathon. This method of defence was preferred by the better off because it was in their control; a navy that needed state organisation and finance would be unpredictable.
In 483 BC a new immensely rich vein of silver was found on state territory at Laurium. It was usual in Greek city-states to distribute surplus revenue among the citizens, but Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to devote the money to building a hundred new triremes. When Aristides attempted to censure the proposal he was ostracized. By 480 BC the navy possessed the unprecedented number of two hundred ships.
By 483 BC Xerxes had resumed preparations for his attack on Greece: two boat bridges were built across the Hellespont, a channel was dug through the isthmus of the peninsula of Mount Athos to avoid the dangerous cape, the Strymon River was bridged, and great food-dumps were placed at stations along the route.
These massive preparations could not be kept secret. The Athenians chose Themistocles as their leader for its war against Persia. Once the invasion was imminent a general amnesty was enacted and the victims of ostracism, including Xanthippus who had been ostracized in 484 BC, were recalled.
In 481 BC a congress of states (Greek League) was called at Corinth under the presidency of Sparta. The results were disappointing. Gelon of Syracuse (r.485-478 BC) and Theron of Acragas (r.c.448-473 BC) demanded the high command either by land or sea, which Sparta and Athens would not concede. Many other Greek cities took the side of the Persians, especially Larissa, Thebes and Argos. Xerxes set out in the spring of 480 BC from Sardis with a fleet and army of around two to three hundred thousand men.
The Peloponnesians’ instinct was to dig in at Corinth, but Themistocles persuaded them that this would be useless if they lost control of the sea; for this it was necessary to save Athens, Aegina, Megara and, if possible, Euboea. The Persian numbers together with their superiority in cavalry and archers made an open land battle against them suicidal; the Greek plan was for the land forces to hold the Persians in defiles just long enough for the fleet to force a Persian withdrawal.
The Greeks decided to concentrate their forces on the east coast of Central Greece, which is covered for over 160 kilometres by the long, narrow Euripus Strait across to the island of Euboea. On the northern tip of the island is the Cape of Artemisium. North of this is the Artemisium Strait, and further north the inhospitable coast of Thessaly runs for a further 130 kilometres, before reaching the Thermaic Gulf. Here the Persian fleet concentrated, in contact with the army.
The task of the Spartan Eurybiades was with 271 triremes to hold Artemisium and prevent the Persian fleet coming down the Thessalian coast to the Euripus Strait; the army had to hold the Persians as far north as possible.
A force of 10,000 men under the Spartan Euainetos was sent north to the valley of the Peneus River at the Vale of Tempe, the main pass into Thessaly from Lower Macedonia. After a few days of reconnaissance and on the advice of Alexander-I of Macedonia (r.c.498-454 BC), the army retired, convinced that Tempe could be turned by another route. North Greece was thus left exposed to the Persian advance. The Persians marched south and Xerxes accepted the submission of Thessaly and neighbouring states.
In August 480 BC a Greek force of about 6000 armoured men led by the Spartan king Leonidas-I (Agiad; r.c.490-480 BC) marched to Thermopylae (‘hot gates’; from its hot sulphur springs): a narrow coastal pass in east Central Greece between Mount Callidromus and the Malian Gulf, linking Thessaly and Malis to east Locris.
If Xerxes could not force this pass then he would either have to turn inland or send the Persian fleet around Euboea to turn the Greek position, i.e. if Thermopylae and Artemisium could be held concurrently then the Persian army and navy would be compelled to separate, but if either position fell then the other would have to be abandoned.
At the end of the summer the Persian navy was caught in a gale off the coast of Magnesia, a region in southeast Thessaly, and lost around a third of their 1200 ships. Then, before the attack on Thermopylae, a detachment of 200 triremes sent round Euboea to close the southern end of the Euripus Strait was destroyed in a second storm near southern Euboea.
When Xerxes’ attack on Thermopylae was thrown back with heavy losses the whole invasion was at a standstill until the entire Persian fleet came out to break the deadlock. In the face of superior numbers the Greek ships to prevent an attack from the rear drew back their wings to form a semicircle then rowed forward to ram and engage the Persians. The fighting was hard and the outcome was still in doubt when night fell.
Leonidas, after repelling attacks for two days, had his mountain flank turned by a Persian force guided by a local man named Ephialtes. Herodotus says that they went a long way round so it is probable that Ephialtes’ route actually outflanked the 1000 Phocians defending the mountain flank. Realising his position was lost, Leonidas chose 1100 Boeotians, some helots and perioikoi, and his Spartiates as a rearguard; the rest he sent away to fight again. Leonidas and his 300 Spartiates died to a man.
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